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WTO Challenges and Efficiency of Chinese Banks
Shujie Yao, Chunxia Jiang, Genfu Feng and Dirk Willenbockel*
Abstract: After joining the WTO in December 2001, China was given 5 years to 
completely open up its banking market for international competition. Chinese banks 
have been renowned for their mounting non-performing loans and low efficiency. 
Despite gradual reforms, the banking system is still dominated by state ownership and 
encapsulated monopolistic control. How to raise efficiency is a key to the survival and 
success of domestic banks, especially the state-owned commercial banks. Two 
important factors may be responsible for raising efficiency: ownership reform and hard 
budget constraints. This paper uses a panel data of 22 banks over the period 1995-2001, 
and employs a stochastic frontier production function to investigate the effects of 
ownership structure and hard budget constraint on efficiency. Empirical results suggest 
that non-state banks were 8-18% more efficient than state banks, and that banks facing 
a harder budget tend to perform better than those heavily capitalized by the state or 
regional governments. The results shed important light on banking sector reform in 
China to face the tough challenges after WTO accession.  
Keywords: WTO, Efficiency, Banking, China
JEL: C52 G14 G21
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1. Introduction
China has experienced rapid economic growth for more than a quarter century since 
economic reforms started in 1978. In the meantime, the banking sector has been subject 
to a process of fundamental structural change and reform. The key objective of reform 
was to change the sector from a centralized, state-owned, monopolistic and 
policy-driven to a decentralized, multi-ownership, competitive and profit-oriented 
system.
Despite the significant changes and reforms in the past decades, the banking system in 
China is still renowned for its low efficiency and mounting non-performing loans 
(NPLs), making further reforms more and more difficult and challenging. As China 
joined the World Trade Organization (WTO) in December 2001, the domestic banking 
market will have to be completely open up for competition with foreign banks and other 
overseas financial institutions. Many foreign banks have now entered China for 
business activities involving foreign currency transactions. The Hong Kong and 
Shanghai Bank Corporation (HSBC) is now allowed to do business in Shanghai 
involving transactions in Renminbi, the Chinese currency. In two years time, all foreign 
banks will be able to do any business that can be done by domestic banks. By June 2004, 
there were already 100 foreign banks conducting Renminbi businesses in 13 large cities, 
and 53 of them were allowed to do such businesses with domestic enterprises (People’s 
Daily, 2004).
The time scale for intense competition is short, but most domestic banks, especially the
four large state-owned commercial banks, are still ridden with mounting NPLs and low 
efficiency. The task to make these banks competitive with international banks such as 
HSBC is undoubtedly onerous and extremely challenging for the Chinese authorities. 
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In response to the immediate challenges, the central government has decided to speed 
up the pace of reforms. Apart from bailing out a huge sum of NPLs from the four 
state-owned banks, the state council has decided to support the Bank of China and 
China Construction Bank with $45 billion from its total foreign exchange reserves of 
$403 billion. This is by far the boldest and toughest decision of the government to 
convert the big state banks into truly commercial institutions. The implication is that 
these two banks will become joint-stock companies, which will soon be placed in the 
stock exchanges. If this reform is successful, a similar reform measure will be applied 
to the other two state banks, the China Industrial and Commercial Bank and the China 
Agricultural Bank.  
One theoretical rationale for the latest banking reform is provided by the agency theory. 
In the past, whenever the state banks ran into difficulty, the principal (the state) had to 
bail them out. The agents (the bank managers), knowing that the principal was the 
ultimate resort of help, lent relentlessly to whatever clients they considered to be 
trustworthy, resulting in mounting NPLs that could never be recovered. By turning the 
state banks into joint stock companies, the incentive structure changes, and it is hoped 
that the state will never have to bail them out in the future. In the short run, the state has 
a responsibility to remove all or much of the NPLs to generate a fresh capital structure 
similar to that of a truly commercial bank so that the banks can compete with  foreign 
entrants on a level playing field. In the long term, the state banks will have to be entirely 
responsible for their own profits and losses without political or administrative 
interference.
A second theoretical perspective on the banking reform is related to budgetary 
constraints. In the past, soft budget constraints meant that state banks were largely 
capitalized using state funds. In the future, once they are listed in the stock market, they 
have to rely more and more on raising capital from shareholders, rendering them to be 
responsible for shareholders’ interests rather than state or local government interests. 
The competitiveness of these banks will depend on their ability to earn profits and 
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paying dividends to shareholders.
Whether the motivation of reform is based on the principal-agent problem, or on the 
impact of budgetary constraints, the ultimate goal is to increase efficiency and 
competitiveness of domestic banks. Whether this goal can be achieved depends on the 
answers to the following two questions. First, can ownership reform and hard budget 
constraints help improve efficiency? Second, can China change the ownership structure 
of its banking system and subject all the state banks to hard budgets in such a short time 
before foreign banks flush into the country for competition?
In this paper, we aim to answer the first question based on available data and 
information. We cannot answer the second question, as it is not yet clear how quickly 
the state council can move to re-capitalize the four large state banks.   
To answer the first question, we employ a stochastic frontier production function and 
use panel data of 22 state-owned and non-state banks for the period 1995-2001. Two 
hypotheses are tested. First, joint stock or non-state banks are more efficient than the 
state-owned banks. Second, banks that are subject to a harder budget constraint are 
more efficient than banks that are subject to a softer budget.
The regression results support both hypotheses and show that the average efficiency 
level is 63% in the data period, which is relatively low compared with that of the US or
European banks. Two factors are found to have a significant impact on the level of 
efficiency: ownership characteristics and equity/asset ratio. On average, non-state 
banks outperform state banks by 8-18% depending on whether the output of banking is 
measured by the amount of loans or by profitability. The equity/asset ratio measures the 
extent of risk taken by banks. It also reflects the extent to which banks are subject to a 
hard budget. If a bank is well capitalized by the state, the equity/asset ratio is high, and 
hence less reluctant to take risk. It is found that banks with a high equity/asset ratio are 
less efficient because they are better capitalized, less risk-taking, and hence subject to a 
Page 4 of 35
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
5
softer budget constraint. 
The empirical results not only support our hypotheses, but also support the government 
efforts to reform the state banks through changing their ownership structure and 
subjecting them to a hard budget. Whether the state can successfully transform the state 
banks, however, remains a challenging issue for the future, but  is beyond the scope of 
this paper.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides background 
information on the Chinese banking system. Section 3 reviews the literature on 
efficiency studies, paying special attention to the banking sector. Section 4 discusses  
methodological issues, including model specifications and data. Section 5 presents and 
evaluates regression results. Section 6 concludes. 
2. Bank reform and WTO challenges
2.1 Banking system reform
Throughout the pre-reform period 1949-78, the Chinese banking 
system was entirely dominated by the People’s Bank of China 
(PBOC), which acted as a central bank and the only commercial bank 
in the country (Dai, 2003). Following economic reforms since 1978, 
the banking system has undergone significant changes. The first 
change was the breaking up of PBOC into two arms, the central bank 
and the commercial operation.  The central bank still retains the name 
PBOC. The commercial operation was split into four specialized 
state-owned banks, or the Big Four in the rest of this paper: the 
Agricultural Bank of China (ABC), the China Construction Bank 
(CCB), the Bank of China (BOC), and the Industrial and Commercial 
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Bank of China (ICBC). The banking system was overwhelmingly 
dominated by the PBOC and the Big Four until the mid-1990s when 
some non-state banks and joint-stock banks were allowed to run 
businesses throughout the country (Wong and Wong, 2001). The 
present banking system in China can be illustrated in Figure 1.Figure 
1 China’s banking system
The Big Four are renowned for their low efficiency, loss-making and mounting NPLs. 
Two main factors were responsible for their current plight. One was that each of them 
provided services mainly to state-owned enterprises (SOEs) within a designated sector 
of the economy. They were operating as some well-encapsulated monopolistic 
institutions, with no responsibility and incentives to penetrate and compete across 
regions and sectors. The ICBC provided services to commercial and industrial 
activities in the urban areas. The ABC was responsible for rural finance. The BOC 
mainly focused on foreign exchange dealing and foreign businesses. The CCB 
provided services to urban large construction projects. Each of the Big Four had 
provincial and local branches and each branch operated within a designated region 
under the administrative control and guidance of the respective local authority. As a 
result, all banks and their local branches had their own servicing niches, ruling out any 
possibility of free competition. Another factor was that the Big Four acted as 
governmental agencies in a planned economy. They were effectively arms of 
government administration to implement production plans projected by the State and 
Regional Planning Commissions. They extended loans to SOEs on the basis of 
fulfilling the national and regional production plans, regardless of profitability, 
resulting in huge volumes of NPLs and losses (Wong and Wong, 2001).
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Since the early 1980s, the banking system has experienced some changes, and the 
intention of such changes is to move the state banks away from being driven by policy 
towards being driven by profit and competition.  In the process of transition, the 
government has assumed concrete steps to reform in order to create a more competitive 
and efficient system. The first step was to remove the limits that a specialized bank had 
to serve a designated sector in order to create a competitive market-based financial 
system in 1985. However, the competition was limited because the operations of the 
Big Four were subject to frequent intervention by the central and local governments. 
The local branches were under government control and much of the lending activities 
were still driven by the needs of policy makers. 
The second step was the establishment of three policy banks in order to take over the 
function of extending policy loans from the Big Four in 1994. Nevertheless, the state 
commercial banks still play a significant role in policy lending. The serving and lending 
capacity of the specialized policy banks are unable to meet the need of policy lending 
previously provided by the Big Four due to the lack of a branch network and capital. 
Moreover, the state commercial banks are often subject to pressure from both the 
central and regional authorities to make loans to their preferred sector and enterprises. 
The third step was the reorganization of the central bank in an effort to eliminate local 
government interference at the end of 1998. The PBOC merged provincial-level 
branches into nine large regional branches. Local governments no longer have the right 
to appoint senior officials for the local branches of PBOC as they did before. 
The fourth step was the establishment of four asset management companies (AMCs) in 
order to unload NPLs from the Big Four in 1999. These AMCs, namely Cinda Asset 
Management Company, China Great Wall Asset Management Company, Oriental 
Asset Management Company, and China Huarong Asset Management Corporation, are 
paired with CCB, ABC, BOC and ICBC, respectively. AMCs were expected to help the 
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Big Four to clean up their balance sheets and to make them more competitive. In 
addition, a five-classification loan standard scheme has been applied to all domestic 
banks in order to control the NPL ratio of new loans. 
Apart from reforming the Big Four, the state allowed regional banks or even non-state 
banks to be established and to compete with the Big Four. The establishment of 
joint-stock commercial banks has injected vigor into the Chinese banking industry by 
creating a new source of competition. In addition, 90 local banks, known as city 
commercial banks, were formed by consolidating former local urban cooperatives. City 
commercial banks all adopted a shareholding ownership structure and were restricted 
geographically within their own localities. These joint-stock banks operate on a pure 
commercial basis focusing on profit maximization and market share.
Having assumed effective measures in a step by step manner, much headway has been 
made in enhancing the competitiveness and efficiency of the banking system. Currently, 
an open and competitive system has been primarily established, comprising the PBOC 
as the central bank, along with the Big Four as mainstay, joint-stock commercial banks 
as growth engines, local commercial banks and foreign banks as complementarities. 
However, despite a rapid expansion of non-state banks, the Big Four still 
overwhelmingly dominate the Chinese banking industry. The four firm concentration 
ratios of total assets, loans and deposits were respectively 84.93%, 84.26%, and 
88.51% in 1998, whilst the four firm concentration ratios of profits was only 55.33%
(Wong and Wong, 2001). These rough indicators suggest that the Big Four are large but 
much less profitable than other types of banks, an issue of interest to be investigated in 
this paper. 
2.2 Facing WTO challenges 
Although much progress has been made on reforming the banking system, the Big Four 
still face with many internal and external challenges. The internal plight is the huge 
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9
volume of NPLs, resulting from policy lending to loss-making SOEs. The external
plight is the lack of operational experiences in a market-based financial system, brought 
about by the specialization of the Big Four to serve the SOE sector. The current 
competitive position of Chinese banks is insufficient to compete with foreign banks 
with immense financial muscles and international experience. For example, the second 
largest bank of the UK, the Royal Bank of Scotland, generated £6.19 billion of pre-tax 
profit in 2003. Its workforce was only 120,000, implying that each employee generated 
on average more than £50,000 (or $90,000) of profit. Obviously, none of the Chinese 
Big Four would be able to compete with the Royal Bank of Scotland if there were no 
protection. 
Table 1 compares the performance between the Bank of China, China’s best 
performing state bank, and three top world-class banking groups, Citibank, HSBC and 
Credit Agricole in 2002. 
Table 1 Comparison of profitability level in 2002 (%)                     
Net income/ 
equity
Net income/ 
assets
Net interest 
revenue/ assets
Operating 
profit / assets
Citibank          15.29 1.27 4.36 7.16
HSBC 12.2 0.938 2.07 3.58
Credit Agricole 7.18 0.42 1.24 2.69
Bank of China 4.61 0.303 1.50 0.44
Source: Bankscope.
In all the four main indicators of performance, the Bank of China is greatly 
outperformed by any of the other banks. The Bank of China’s profit/assets ratio is only 
a small fraction of that of Citibank. Its net income/equity ratio is only one fourth of that 
of Citibank, and its net income/asset ratio is just one third of that of HSBC. 
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In the past, there were high entry barriers and business restrictions for foreign banks,
including geographic restrictions and entry requirements. Under the WTO rules, there 
is no restriction on foreign currency business upon accession in all parts of the country. 
For Renminbi (RMB), or local currency business, however, the opening process as 
shown in Table 2 is gradual in terms of time and locality. The geographic restriction is 
phased out in six stages. Upon accession, RMB business by foreign banks is allowed in 
four large cities, Shanghai, Shenzhen, Tianjin and Dalian. It will then be expanded to 
Guangzhou, Zhuhai, Qingdao, Nanjing and Wuhan within one year of accession, to
Jinan, Fuzhou, Chengdu and Chongqing within two years, to Kunming, Beijing and 
Xiamen within three years, to Shantou, Ningbo, Shenyang and Xian within four years, 
and to all parts of the country within five years (i.e., 2006) after accession.
Table 2 Opening schedule for the banking sector after WTO accession
Year Business Scope Geographic Coverage
2002 No restriction on Foreign 
Currency
Business RMB business in 
9 cities
2003 RMB business to Chinese 
enterprises
13cities
2004 16 cities
2005 20 cities
2006 RMB business to all 
Chinese clients
No restriction
Source: WTO data cited in Huang (2004).
Hence, how to reform domestic banks, especially the Big Four, and how to improve 
their efficiency has become an urgent and important issue of concern after WTO 
accession. Indeed, the need for reforming the Big Four is due to the pressure of 
competition from both outsiders and insiders. With China’s entry into WTO, domestic 
commercial banks will face more and more competition and challenges from foreign 
banks. The Big Four will compete with their sophisticated foreign rivals on an 
international competitive market basis. With further reform, the Chinese banking 
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institutions will have unprecedented opportunities to enjoy their increasing weight in 
the international financial system. The prospect of the Chinese economy also motivates 
the Big Four to reform themselves. 
3. Measuring banking efficiency: a selective review
Over the last half a century, much attention has been devoted to banking efficiency 
study. Regarding the sources of inefficiency in banking, earlier studies tended to focus 
on economies of scale by examining whether costs per unit can be reduced by 
increasing output, and economies of scope by examining whether costs per unit can be 
lowered by joint production. Empirical studies of scale and scope economies show 
significant scale economies for medium-sized banks of $100 million to $5 billion in 
assets in the 1980s. However, recent studies indicate that scale economies have 
increased substantially, existing for large banks of $10 billion to $25 billion in assets in 
the 1990s. The recent merger and acquisition in the UK banking sector provides a good 
example of scale economies involving huge commercial banks. Such examples include 
the merger of the Royal Bank of Scotland with the National Westminster Bank, the 
Bank of Scotland with Halifax, and the earlier acquisition of Midlands Bank by HSBC 
and the merger of Lloyds and TSB. As for scope economies, however, empirical studies 
reveal small cost inefficiencies (Saunders, 1999). 
More recently, efficiency research has shifted to production efficiency which consists 
of two components: technical efficiency and allocative efficiency. Technical efficiency 
refers to the ability of optimal utilization of available resources either by producing 
maximum output for a given input bundle or by using minimum inputs to produce a 
given output. Allocative efficiency refers to the ability to achieve the optimal 
combination of inputs and outputs for a given level of prices (Lovell, 1993). In the 
context of production efficiency, x-efficiency first introduced by Leibenstein (1966) is 
attributed to overall objective determinants, such as improvement in management and 
application of technologies, regardless of size (scale) and product mix (scope). Within a 
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data set, the best-practice frontier or the worst-practice frontier can be estimated. The 
difference between the best-practice frontier and the practice of a particular firm 
reflects its x-inefficiency (Reifschneider and Stevenson, 1991, Molyneux et al, 1996).
In the literature, two main controversial issues addressed by researchers are how to 
define and measure inputs and outputs of banks and how to determine the best-practice 
frontier to evaluate their performance. Indeed, how to measure banking outputs and 
inputs is one of the most difficult issues because of the distinct features of banks. 
Unlike manufacturing firms producing physical goods, banks not only produce 
unidentifiable products—intermediary services, but also provide a wide range of 
products—multi-products. A number of measures on banking output have been 
employed in early efficiency research, such as the number of deposit and loan accounts
and the dollars in each account.
By emphasizing the basic nature of a bank’s production process rather than stock 
variables, a services flow offered to customers can be considered as bank output. There 
are two main approaches to measure services flow: the production approach and the 
intermediation approach. The production approach treats banks as firms producing 
different deposit and loan accounts. The number and type of transactions and 
documents are considered to be the best measure of bank output. However, such
specific data are generally unavailable and therefore, in practice, the number of deposit 
and loan accounts is usually employed as the measure of bank output. The 
intermediation approach pioneered by Sealey and Lindley (1977) treats banks as 
financial intermediaries channeling funds between depositors and creditors. In the 
production process, the value of bank loan and investment is considered to be output, 
while labour and deposit capital are treated as inputs. This approach is distinguished 
from the production approach by adding deposits to inputs, with consideration of both 
operating cost and interest cost (Goddard et al., 2001). Neither the production approach 
nor the intermediation approach is perfect, they are complementary instead (Berger and 
Humphrey 1997). Each approach emphasizes one side of the role played by banks and
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can be applied to different levels of efficiency research. The production approach is 
appropriate for studying the cost efficiency of banks by addressing the operation costs 
of banking. The intermediation approach is appropriate for studying the economic 
differentiation of banks by controlling the overall costs of banking (Ferrier and Lovell, 
1990). This approach takes interest expenses into account, which is useful not only for 
examining bank efficiency but also for frontier analysis. 
Different estimation techniques have been applied to bank efficiency research. Berger 
and Humphrey (1997) provides a valuable survey on 130 financial institution efficiency 
studies in which five main approaches are identified. These approaches can be 
classified into two main categories — parametric and non-parametric techniques. 
Parametric technique and non-parametric technique were roughly equally adopted. 
Overall, their survey shows similar efficiency estimates resulting from parametric and 
non-parametric techniques. On average, there is about 20% cost inefficiency and about 
half of profit inefficiency in the US. Studies employing non-parametric techniques
obtain lower average efficiency estimates and greater dispersion than studies using 
parametric techniques. Despite the similarity of average efficiency estimates, 
disagreement about inefficiency rankings of individual firms exists.
Parametric methods can be subdivided into three main approaches to determine the 
best-practice frontier. The first approach is the stochastic frontier approach (SFA) 
developed  independently by Aigner, Lovell, and Schmidt (1977) and Meeusen and van 
den Broeck (1977). SFA specifies a functional form for the cost, profit or production 
function, which allows inefficiencies to be included in the error term. Two 
distributional assumptions on the error terms to separate the two components are (1) the 
inefficiencies follow an asymmetric half-normal distribution, based on the logic that 
inefficiencies only increase costs above frontier levels, and  (2) random errors follow a 
symmetric standard normal distribution because random fluctuations can either 
increase or reduce costs (Bauer at el.,1993). Relevant literature on applications of SFA 
to banking can be found in Ferrier and Lovell (1990) and Bauer at el. (1993). In China, 
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this approach has been used to investigate grain production and technical efficiency by 
Yao and Liu (1998). However, to the best of our knowledge there is no such study for 
the Chinese banking sector. On the other hand, there are many empirical studies for the 
banking sector in other countries or economies, including Shen (2005) and Huang and 
Wang (2004) for Taiwanese banks, Elyasiani and Mehdian (1995) and Fare et al (2004) 
for the US banks, and Girardone et al (2004) for Italian banks. 
The other two parametric approaches are the distribution free approach (DFA) and the 
thick frontier approach (TFA). DFA assumes that efficiency differences are stable over 
time. The estimated efficiency of each firm is the difference between its mean residual 
and industrial mean residual on the frontier. TFA has no restriction of distributional 
assumption. TFA estimates provide an overall level of efficiency rather than point 
efficiency estimates for individual firms. This approach has been employed in Berger 
and Humphrey (1997), Bauer et al. (1993) and Drake and Simper (2002).
Unlike parametric techniques that specify a functional form for the production function,
non-parametric techniques impose fewer restrictions on the production frontier. 
Non-parametric methods can be divided into two subcategories: data envelopment
analysis (DEA) and free disposal hull (FDH). DEA is a linear programming method 
used for estimating efficiency of decision making units. DEA creates a production 
frontier directly based on a particular data set of firms rather than a specific functional 
form. The distance from the best-practice frontier reflects a firm’s inefficiency
(Charnes et al. 1978). Examples of DEA applications in banking are Ferrier and Lovell 
(1990). In China, one recent application of the DEA technique is found in Zheng et al.
(2003) on state-owned enterprise performance. FDH is a special case of DEA by 
relaxing the hypothesis of convexity (Berger and Humphrey, 1997). DEA has been 
widely applied in many recent empirical studies, including Hauner (2005) for German 
and Austrian banks, Ataullah et al (2004) for Indian and Pakistani banks, Casu and 
Molyneux (2003) for European banks, and Favero and Pari (1995) for Italian banks.
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Each approach to determine the efficiency frontier possesses certain advantages and 
disadvantages. Non-parametric technique allows efficiency to vary over time and does 
not require prior assumptions about the distribution of inefficiency across observations. 
However, its important drawback is the assumption of no random errors influencing 
bank performance. Ignoring the existence of potential errors, the effects of omitted 
errors may be included into efficiency estimates (Berger and Humphrey, 1997). 
Another drawback of the non-parametric technique is the neglect of price effects on 
efficiency—allocative efficiency, addressing only technological efficiency. As to the 
parametric technique, a crucial disadvantage is the pre-specified functional form for 
efficiency frontier, which may result in an inaccurate efficiency measurement (Berger 
and Humphrey, 1997). Given that we use a panel data of 22 banks covering 6 years, 
there will be significant variations of efficiencies across different kinds of banks in 
different time periods. In other words, the effects of random errors could be large. As a 
result, the parametric approach, especially the stochastic frontier production function 
approach, is considered to be most suitable for this study.
4. The stochastic frontier production model
4.1 A theoretical model
This study adopts the intermediation approach to measure bank inputs and outputs 
since its key concern is to identify the main determinants of efficiency. Outputs of 
banks are defined as the book value of pre-tax profit, and/or the book value of loans.
This is because the specific frontier production model does not allow multi-outputs. 
The value of loans includes short-term, medium and long-term, and other loans, after 
deducting loan loss reserves. The value of pre-tax profit is an accounting item.  Bank 
inputs are defined as fixed assets, deposit, equity and labour in both profit and loan 
models. 
Previous studies have adopted a two-stage estimation procedure with shortcoming of 
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the inconsistency in its assumptions concerning the independence of the inefficiency 
effects in the two estimation stages. This study adopts a single-stage estimation 
technique proposed by Battese and Coelli (1995) and Coelli (1992), with an assumption 
that non-negative technical inefficiency effects are a function of firm-specific variables 
and time. The distributional assumption is that the inefficiency effects are 
independently distributed as truncations of normal distributions with constant variance, 
but with means that are a linear function of observable variables. The model shown 
below allows the estimation of both technical change in the stochastic frontier and 
time-varying technical inefficiencies.
)(0 ititittit UVxtY +++=   ,  i=1, …, N; t=1,…,T,       (1)
where i and t denote firm and time, Yit the logged output variable, itx a vector of logged 
input variables, itV  a random variable assumed to be distributed with mean zero and a 
constant variance N (0, 2v ),   a vector of unknown parameters to be estimated, itU  a 
non-negative random variable associated with technical inefficiency of production, 
which is assumed to be independently distributed as truncation at zero of  N( itm , 2u ).
The specification of the technical inefficiency effects, itU , is 
itittit WztU +++=  0 , (2)
where itz  is a vector of explanatory variables associated with technical inefficiency of
production over time,   a vector of unknown coefficients to be estimated, itW  a
random variable defined  by the truncation of the normal distribution with zero mean
and variance 2 .
The technical efficiency of production for the i-th bank at the t-th time is defined as:
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)exp()exp( itititit WzUTE ==  . (3)
The time trend variable t included in the stochastic production function (1) accounts for 
neutral technical progress at a constant rate, while the presence of t in the inefficiency 
function (2) is for capturing temporal changes in inefficiency at a constant rate against 
the shifting frontier with respect to time. Therefore, productivity changes are 
decomposed into the shift in the frontier and a movement towards or off the frontier
(Yao and Liu, 1998).
4.2 An empirical model
Because bank output can be measured as profit or the value of loans, the same 
production function is estimated in two different versions. One uses pre-tax profits as 
output, the other the value of loans. The profit model is shown in equations (4) and (5). 
The loan model has the same structure and explanatory variables as the profit model.
ititit
ititit
UVLabourEquity
DepositFixedassettprofit
+++
+++=
)ln()ln(
)ln()ln()ln(
54
3210

 (4)
OwnershipratioAEUit 210 )/ln(  ++= (5)
where subscripts i and t respectively denote banks and time; ln denotes natural 
logarithm. In this model, output is measured by profit before tax, while inputs are 
measured by fixed assets, deposit, equity and labour. In the inefficiency function, two 
explanatory variables are bank-specific variables—equity/assets (E/A) ratio and 
ownership characteristic which are expected to have effects on inefficiency. In 
estimation, the ownership variable takes the value of one for non-state banks and zero
for state-owned banks.
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Equity includes share or/and own capital, as well as retained profits. Assets include 
loans, fixed assets and other assets. It can also be defined as total liabilities plus equity, 
where total liabilities include deposits, borrowing from other institutions and other 
funds. If a bank is capitalized and supported by the state, equity also includes state 
capital. If a bank is a joint-stock company, part of its equity will be share capital. As 
total assets include loans, a bank is subject to higher risk with a lower E/A ratio, as for a 
given amount of equity, the bank is exposed to more liabilities. If a bank is well 
capitalized with support from the government, E/A can be increased if total liabilities
are fixed. The recent efforts of the state council to inject $45 billion to BOC and CCB 
are to help them raise the E/A ratio, and hence reduce their risk. An earlier effort by the 
government to use AMCs to remove some NPLs from the Big Four served the same
purpose. 
Hence, the E/A ratio can be interpreted in different aspects. A lower E/A may mean that 
the bank is less capitalized and subject to a harder budget constraint, but it has to take 
more risk in order to increase loans to its clients. If the government is involved in 
changing the E/A ratio, different banks will be subject to different budget constraints. 
Usually, the state will support the state-owned banks, helping them to have a lower E/A 
ratio than the non-state banks, ceteris paribus. As a result, if the E/A ratio is negatively 
associated with efficiency, it implies that soft budget will lead to low efficiency, or vice 
versa.
4.3 Data
The data are obtained from Bankscope for 22 commercial banks over the period 
1995-2001. Of the 22 banks, 2 have data for 1996-2001, 7 for 1995-2000, and the rest 
for 1995-2001, forming an unbalanced panel data set. In terms of ownership, the 
sample banks include the Big Four, 11 shareholding banks, and 7 small commercial 
banks that are ultimately owned by one of the Big Four or state council. The summary 
statistics of banking outputs and inputs are reported in Table 3. 
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Table 3 Summary statistics, mean values of 22 banks 1995-2001 (billion yuan)
variables 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Pre-tax 
profit 6.81 8.26 9.19 8.49 8.50 8.77 7.81
Loan 745.5 903.3 1004.6 1142.2 1214.7 1210.7 1359.9
Fixed 
assets 13.52 19.22 20.15 22.46 29.80 36.41 32.97
Deposit 334.27 406.07 512.72 604.70 716.04 820.51 920.97
Equity 48.28 49.12 50.75 94.42 93.25 96.24 97.31
E/A ratio 
(%) 6.67 6.115 6.955 8.25 8.135 8.165 8.172
Source: Calculated by authors based on data for sample period obtained from Bankscope: 
http://bankscope.bvdep.com.
5. Results and interpretations
5.1 The profit model 
Maximum-likelihood (ML) estimates of parameters in the profit model are obtained 
using a modification of the computer program, FRONTIER 4.1 (Coelli, 1996). These 
ML estimates and the standard errors are reported in Table 4. 
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Table 4 Regression results, dependent variable = ln (profit before tax)
Variables ML estimates T-Value
A. Production Function
Intercept 0.8469 5.5502 
Time -0.0940 -6.6178 
Fixed-asset 0.1611 2.6673 
Deposit 0.3503 4.6373 
Equity 0.3311 2.6200 
Labour 0.1020 0.8928
B. Inefficiency Function
Intercept -10.9032 -6.2360 
Equity/Asset Ratio 4.3702 13.6217 
Ownership -2.8344 -4.8537 
C. Variance parameters
Sigma-squared 3.8463 4.3056 
Gamma 0.9951 237.3926 
D. Diagnosis and other information
LR test 146.4644 
Ln (likelihood) -95.5927 
Number of observations 154 
Number of years 7 
Number of cross-sections 22 
Average technical efficiency 0.6300 
Notes: (1) All the variables are in natural logarithms.
(2) Negative sign in the inefficiency function indicates that the variable has a positive effect on production 
efficiency and vice versa.
The signs of the estimated coefficients are as expected and all coefficients are 
statistically significant at or below the 5% critical level except that for labour. The 
insignificance of the estimated labour coefficient is not surprising given that most 
banks may be still overstaffed even after many years of reforms. The estimated 
coefficients for fixed-asset, deposit and equity are their elasticities with respect to 
profits. Deposit and equity have roughly the same value of elasticity at 0.3503 and 
0.3311, respectively. The elasticity of fixed-asset is relatively small at 0.1611, but it is 
significant. The presence of the one-sided error component is justified by the LR test, 
which is highly significant. The estimates of variance ratio ( )/( 222 vuu  += ) of 
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0.9951 indicates that the inefficiency element itU is stochastic. 
The average level of technical efficiency over the sample period is 63%, leaving a gap 
with the maximum possible level of 37%. The average estimated efficiencies of 22 
banks are plotted in Figure 2. The most efficient bank is China Merchants Bank Co Ltd 
with an average technical efficiency of 91.23%, whilst the most inefficient bank is ABC 
with an efficiency of 40.95%. Wide efficiency differentiations across banks observed 
here indicate that there is a substantial potential for improving the overall efficiency of 
Chinese banks.
Figure 2  Average Efficiency of China's banks (profit) (1995-
-2001)
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Note: The numbers on the X-axis represent individual banks (see appendix A for detail).
As the Big Four have a dominant position in the banking industry and are the focus of 
imminent reform, it is worth looking at their efficiency levels in detail. The average 
efficiencies of the Big Four during the data period are plotted in Figure 3. ABC is the 
least efficient bank in terms of profitability. Its efficiency also fluctuates drastically 
over time. On the other hand, its efficiency rose slightly with the same pattern as that of 
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ICBC and BOC from 1995. The CCB enjoyed significant efficiency gain after suffering 
a systemic shock in 1998, when the Asian Financial Crisis hit China hard. However, the 
efficiency of CCB declined sharply in 2000 and 2001, while that of ICBC and BOC 
decreased slightly and that of ABC increased instead. The efficiency of ICBC and BOC 
exhibited a similar and stable pattern. Both ICBC and BOC achieved efficiency gains 
for two years from 1995 and underwent a decline from 1997, again coincided with the 
Asian Financial Crisis. The ICBC picked up efficiency growth in 1998 and sustained a 
steady increase thereafter. The efficiency of BOC deteriorated further up to 1999 and 
improved in the next two years. The average technical efficiencies of ICBC and BOC 
were 78.28% and 80.55% respectively, much above the industrial average and even 
above the average of joint-stock banks of 77.48%. This result indicates an encouraging 
exception of state-owned commercial banks, which could be as efficient as joint-stock 
banks.   
Figure 3  Average Efficiency of the Big Four(Profit)
 (1995--2001)
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The estimated coefficients in the inefficiency model are of particular interest to this 
study. The technical inefficiencies are regressed on two explanatory variables: E/A ratio 
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and ownership characteristic. The E/A ratio has a positive impact on inefficiencies. 
Banks are more efficient with a low E/A ratio which reflects more risk-taking. In other 
words, well-capitalized banks are less efficient, confirming our hypothesis on budget 
constraints. If banks are subject to a soft budget, such as the state-owned banks, their 
capital assets are manly raised from state funds. But if banks are subject to a hard 
budget, they have to raise capital from shareholders. One consequence is that they will 
tend to be less capitalized, and hence have to take more risk to make profits (Koch and 
MacDonald, 2000). 
Another explanatory variable is ownership characteristic measured by a dummy 
variable taking a value of 0 for state-owned banks and a value of 1 for joint-stock banks. 
As reported in the second part of Table 4, ownership has a significant impact on 
technical efficiency with an estimated coefficient of -2.53. The negative sign indicates 
that joint-stock banks are more efficient. The impact of ownership characteristic on 
bank efficiency is depicted in Figure 4. Joint-stock banks are found to have 
outperformed state-owned banks by about 18 percentage points over the data period. 
The estimated average technical efficiency of state-owned banks is 59.61% and that of 
joint-stock banks is 77.48%. This result suggests that ownership structure is an 
important variable in explaining the variations of overall inefficiency. Moreover, Figure 
4 exhibits a similar trend of technical efficiencies between state-owned and non-state 
banks. The average efficiencies of state-owned and non-state banks increased from 
1995 to reach a peak in 1996 and 1997, respectively. During the Asian Financial Crisis, 
the efficiency level declined and touched the lowest point in 1998. Thereafter, the 
average technical efficiencies of both state and non-state banks increased steadily over 
the last four years of the data period. These similar trends reflect both the external as 
well as the internal shocks. External shocks were largely triggered by the Asian 
Financial Crisis, but the internal shocks reflected the government’s efforts to improve 
banking efficiency during the post-crisis period.  Our results suggest that the tightening 
policy in the aftermath of the Financial Crisis had paid a high dividend.
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Figure 4  Average efficiency of the Big Four and joint-stock banks 
(profit)(1995--2001)
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5.2 The loan model
The picture that emerges from the loan model is similar to that of the profit model, as 
shown in Table 5. The signs of the coefficients are consistent with that of the profit 
model and all coefficients are statistically significant except for labour. The estimated 
coefficients for fixed-asset, deposit and equity are 0.0841, 0.4606 and 0.6232, 
respectively. Deposit and equity have stronger impact than in the profit model. The 
negative coefficient of year indicates that the output level tends to decrease by 1.09%
per year over the data period. The LR test and the estimates of variance ratios also 
confirm the presence of a one-sided error component which represents the stochastic 
inefficiency component itU .
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Table 3 Regression results, dependent variable = ln (loans)
Variables ML estimates T-Value
A. Production Function
Intercept 0.1909 1.6207 
Time -0.0109 -0.6404 
Fixed-asset 0.0841 2.4651 
Deposit 0.4606 11.5178 
Equity 0.6232 9.5670 
Labour 0.0860 1.2203
B. Inefficiency Function
Intercept -0.2683 -1.9051 
Time 0.0268 1.4709 
Equity/Asset Ratio 0.4525 7.3413 
Ownership -0.2756 -6.4406 
C. Variance parameters
Sigma-squared 0.0347 8.6795 
Gamma 0.1141 0.5730 
D. Diagnosis and other information
LR test 92.2811 
Ln (likelihood) 40.7622 
Number of observations 154 
Number of years 7 
Number of cross-sections 22 
Average technical efficiency 0.6392 
Notes: (1) All the variables are in natural logarithms.
      (2) Negative sign in the inefficiency function indicates that the variable has a positive effect on production 
efficiency and vice versa.
The estimated average technical efficiency is 63.91%, which is slightly higher than in 
the profit model. The average estimated efficiencies for 22 individual banks are 
graphed in Figure 5. The most efficient bank is China Minsheng Banking Corporation 
with an average technical efficiency of 89%, while the most inefficient bank is the Bank 
of China (BOC) with an average technical efficiency of 58.03%. 
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Figure 5 Average efficiency (loans) (1995-2001)
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Although the estimated coefficients on the time trends in the frontier production model 
and the inefficiency function are insignificant, they reveal a declining trend over time. 
The negative coefficient on the time trend in the frontier production function indicates 
that the production frontier moved downward by 1.09% annually. The positive
coefficient on the time trend in the inefficiency function reveals that the inefficiencies 
of production tended to increase by 2.68% per year. This implies that both efficiency 
and the production frontier moved downward over the data period. 
The efficiency of the Big Four is shown in Figure 6. A different picture emerges 
compared with that of the profit model. The average estimated efficiencies for the Big 
Four have a similar trend and level. Efficiencies of the Big Four are stable over the first 
three years of sample period, followed by a downward slump in 1997. Again this is 
coincided with the Asian Financial Crisis. Later on, the efficiency level of the Big Four 
roughly remained unchanged except for BOC, which experienced a decline. This result 
is perhaps an evidence of government intervention on lending decisions. During and 
after the Asian Financial Crisis, the state council ordered the Big Four to lend about 100 
billion yuan per year of special loans to boost the domestic economy.
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Different pictures from the profit and loan models can perhaps be attributed to the 
distinct degree of government intervention on banks. Direct government intervention 
resulted in a similar efficiency trend and level among the Big Four in the loan model. 
The Big Four still acted as government’s arms in a policy-driven financial system 
despite many years of reform to reduce intervention and policy lending. 
Figure 6  Average efficiency of the Big Four (Loan) 
(1995-2001)
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As for the inefficiencies, they are also influenced by the E/A ratio and ownership 
characteristic. The elasticity of E/A ratio is 0.4525 and statistically significant, 
indicating a positive impact on inefficiencies. It is consistent with the result of the profit 
model. Again, ownership is found to have different impact on inefficiency with an 
estimated coefficient of -0.2756, which is small but significant. The smaller impact of 
ownership characteristic on bank inefficiencies compared to that of the profit model can 
be considered as evidence that both state-owned banks and joint-stock banks are both 
subject to government intervention in lending. The impact of ownership characteristic 
on bank efficiency from 1995 to 2001 is shown in Figure 7. The Big Four are more 
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efficient than the joint-stock banks in the first three years by 10 percentage points. In 
1998, the efficiency of the Big Four encountered a sharp downward slump from 
76.90% to 52.68%, while that of the joint-stock banks remained unchanged. During the 
last three years, joint-stock banks became more efficient than the Big Four. This result 
is different from that of the profit model in which joint-stock banks are 18% more 
efficient than the state-owned banks throughout the sample period. However, 
joint-stock banks are still more efficient than the state-owned banks by 8 percentage 
points on average over the sample period. This result is attributable to the different 
degree of government intervention. Although government can influence lending 
decision of both state and non-state banks, the extent of intervention on the latter tends 
to be less than on the former.
Figure 7 Average efficiency of the Big Four and joint-stock banks 
(loan)(1995-2001)
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6. Conclusions
The estimated average efficiency of the sample banks is quite low at 63% in both the 
profit and loan models, but not fundamentally different from that of previous studies for 
other countries. In the literature, the average efficiency score is about 80% for the US 
banks (Berger and Humphrey, 1997). The difference of efficiency estimates is 
consistent with the fact that Chinese banks are more subject to government control and 
intervention despite many years of reform.
The Big Four have a dominant position in the banking industry. They were given a legal 
status in 1995, the first year of our data period, as commercial banks with a principal 
objective of making profits. However, after many years of reforms, the efficiency level 
was still low and did not improve significantly over time. On the one hand, it suggests 
that government intervention in lending decision still persists, on the other hand, it 
reveals that there exists a great potential for efficiency improvement.
In this paper, we hypothesize that ownership reform and change of budgetary 
constraints should lead to more competition and hence greater efficiency gains. Our 
data set provides information for constructing a stochastic frontier production function 
indicating that joint-stock banks outperform state-banks by 18% in profitability and 8%
in loans. The empirical results also suggest that banks which are subject to a hard 
budget, and hence less capitalized, tend to take more risk and become more efficient 
than those which are subject to a softer budget constraint and hence more capitalized. 
The results have important policy implications on bank reforms in China in face of  the
WTO challenges in the immediate future.
As China has to open up its banking market for international competition, domestic 
banks have to become more efficient as quickly as possible. Two fundamental reforms 
are needed. First, the state banks, which have enjoyed a dominant position, have to 
become truly commercialized, to be entirely free from government control and 
Page 29 of 35
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
30
intervention, to be re-capitalized so that their capital structure will resemble that of a 
western commercial bank, to have a better corporate government and incentive 
structure so that internal efficiency can increase as rapidly as possible. The second 
reform is to allow more and more medium and small banks to enter the market and 
compete with the state banks. The number of small and medium banks has increased 
enormously in recent years, but most of them are still under control by regional or local 
governments. Most of them are not well managed and may lack the economies of scale 
and scope to compete with foreign banks. 
Although the empirical results in this paper confirms that ownership reforms and 
change of budgetary constraints can force banks to become more efficient, the 
problems faced by the Chinese banks are so many and so difficult that it may take many 
more years for them to compete successfully with foreign banks. The most recent 
decision to re-capitalize BOC and CCB is a significant step towards this direction. 
However, whether this reform is successful will depend on how the Big Four respond to 
the new reform method. We have not paid much attention to the problem of NPLs 
which is estimated to be as high as 30-40%, although the official figure is only 15-20%. 
If banks are still ridden with so much NPLs and if corporate governance is still heavily 
influenced by politics, the chance of success is very small. Hence, our conclusion is that 
China will have to face more pains in the near future when foreign large banks enter the 
domestic market and compete head on with the Big Four. This is where the real fight 
will begin and more radical reform measures have to be taken not only on 
re-capitalization but also on appointment of senior management and the way that banks 
are currently managed. 
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Appendix A: Name of Chinese banks  
Bank name corresponding number
Industrial & Commercial Bank of China 
(The) – ICBC 1
Bank of China 2
China Construction Bank 3
Agricultural Bank of China 4
Bank of Communications 5
CITIC Industrial Bank 6
Shanghai Pudong Development Bank 7
China Merchants Bank Co Ltd 8
China Everbright Bank 9
China Minsheng Banking Corporation 10 
Guangdong Development Bank 11
Hua Xia Bank 12
Industrial Bank Co Ltd 13
Bank of Shanghai 14
Shenzhen Development Bank Co., Ltd. 15
Sin Hua Bank Limited 16
Kwangtung Provincial Bank (The) 17
Kincheng Banking Corporation 18
National Commercial Bank Ltd. 19
China State Bank Ltd. 20
Yien Yieh Commercial Bank Ltd. 21
China & South Sea Bank Ltd., (The) 22
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